Parochial Interests and the Centralized Provision of Local Public Goods: Evidence from Congressional Voting on Transportation Projects by Brian Knight
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
PAROCHIAL INTERESTS AND THE CENTRALIZED
PROVISION OF LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS:









An earlier version of this paper was titled “The Advantages and Disadvantages of Centralized Provision of
Public Goods: Evidence from Congressional Voting on Transportation Projects”. Jim Andreoni, Reza Baqir,
Moshe Buchinsky, Victor Davis, Jonah Gelbach, Mike Hanmer, Bob Inman, John Straub, and Koleman
Strumpf provided helpful comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily
those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2003 by Brian Knight.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text not to exceed two paragraphs, may be
quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given to the source.Parochial Interests and the Centralized Provision of Local Public Goods: Evidence from
Congressional Voting on Transportation Projects
Brian Knight
NBER Working Paper No. 9748
June 2003
JEL No. H4, H7, D7
ABSTRACT
Local public goods financed from a national tax base provide concentrated benefits to receipient
jurisdictions but disperse costs, creating incentives for legislators to increase own-district spending
but to restrain aggregate spending due to the associated tax costs. While these common pool
incentives underpin a variety of theoretical analyses, which tend to predict inefficiencies in the
allocation of public goods, there is little direct evidence that individual legislators respond to such
incentives. To test for reactions to such incentives, this paper analyzes 1998 Congressional votes
over transportation project funding. The empirical results provide evidence that legislators respond
to common pool incentives: the probability of supporting the projects is increasing in own-district
spending and decreasing in the tax burden associated with aggregate spending. Having found that
legislators do respond to such incentives, I use the parameter estimates to calculate the efficient level
of public goods, which suggest over-spending in aggregate, especially in politically powerful
districts, and large associated deadweight loss.
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Brian_Knight@Brown.edu“Mississippi is getting tired of dirt roads; we want some asphalt.”
Sen. Trent Lott (R, Mississippi), CQ Almanac, 1998
“The only guarantee that donor states should expect from this legislation is that
they will continue to subsidize road projects in other states”
Sen. John McCain (R, Arizona), CQ Almanac, 1998
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the United States, the federal government provides funding for many types of public goods
that are primarily local in nature. Examples include highways, bridges, water projects, and
airports. Such spending programs provide geographically concentrated beneﬁts to recipient
jurisdictions but disperse costs due to a national, or common pool, tax base. In central legisla-
tures with locally-elected representatives, such as the U.S. Congress, this geographic disconnect
between program beneﬁts and costs creates incentives for legislators to increase own-district
spending because the district bears only a small share of the associated tax costs. Countering
this bias towards higher spending, each legislator has an incentive to restrain spending in other
districts due to the associated tax costs.
This characteristic of centrally-provided local public goods, concentrated beneﬁts and dis-
persed tax costs, is central to models of legislative behavior. Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson
(1981) focus on the ﬁrst incentive created by common pool tax bases, namely the preference
to expand own-district spending. In their model, legislatures operate according to a cooper-
ative, or universalistic, norm under which each legislator independently chooses own-district
spending, leading to ineﬃciently high spending in every district and hence in aggregate. In
non-cooperative models of legislative bargaining, such as that of Baron and Ferejohn (1987 and
1989), both the incentives to expand own-district spending and to restrain aggregate spending
are present, and the legislative outcome is one in which public spending is misallocated: pub-
lic goods are over-provided in jurisdictions with political power and under-provided elsewhere.
The recent literature on political federalism has applied these models of legislature behavior
in order to re-address a classic question in public economics: within a federation, which level
of government should provide public goods? By incorporating spillovers into these models of
legislative behavior, this literature has identiﬁed a trade-oﬀ between the ability of centralized
governments to internalize cross-jurisdiction spillovers and its tendency towards pork-barrel
over-spending, particularly in politically powerful districts.1
1See Inman and Rubinfeld (1997a, 1997b), Besley and Coate (2003), and Lockwood (2002).
2While the incentives created by national ﬁnancing of local public goods underpin these
theoretical analyses, there is little direct evidence that legislators respond to such incentives.
In order to test for such common pool incentives, this paper uses 1998 Congressional votes over
transportation project funding; this empirical voting analysis is shown to be consistent with
the two most commonly-used legislative processes in the theoretical literature and is thus quite
general. The empirical results demonstrate that legislator choices reﬂect these common pool
incentives: the probability of supporting funding for the projects is increasing in own-district
spending and decreasing in the tax burden associated with aggregate spending. These results
are robust to several alternative speciﬁcations, although the tax cost relationship is statistically
insigniﬁcant in several cases. Having found that legislators do respond to such incentives, I
then estimate the underlying theoretical parameters and use these in order to calculate the
degree of ineﬃciency associated with the common pool problem. These calculations suggest
over-spending in aggregate, particularly in politically powerful districts, and large associated
deadweight loss.
2 Related literature
The vast majority of empirical research on common tax pool incentives has used legislatures as
the empirical unit of analysis. Inman (1988) attempts to measure the over-provision of federal
grants in the U.S. Congress by using a 1972 shift in Congressional norms from one of decision-
making by strong political parties towards one of decentralized decision-making in which each
legislator internalizes only his district’s share of the tax costs. Inman attributes a signiﬁcant
portion of the increase in grants after 1972 to this shift and predicts that a decentralized
Congress would have spent almost 50 percent less were they forced to fully internalize tax
costs, implying a deadweight loss of 17 cents for every dollar allocated. A related literature uses
variation in the size of legislatures, and hence the degree of the common pool problem, across
municipalities (Baqir, 2002), U.S. states (Gilligan and Matsusaka, 1995 and Crain, 1999), and
countries (Bradbury and Crain, 2001). These studies have documented a positive relationship
between the size of legislatures and government spending.
Since these analyses rely on both a speciﬁcation of the legislative process and maintained
behavioral assumptions on the part of legislators, analyses at the legislator level, which rely
on less stringent assumptions, are a useful complement. The only such analysis of which
I am aware is DelRossi and Inman (1999), who use variation in local cost sharing rules for
water projects to gauge the extent to which legislator demands for spending respond to the
share ﬁnanced by the federal government. The estimated price elasticity of demand is large,
ranging from -0.81 to -2.55. Relative to DelRossi and Inman, my paper makes several contri-
3butions. First, while DelRossi and Inman focus on the ﬁrst incentive created by a common tax
pool, namely a preference to expand own-district spending due to common pool tax bases, my
analysis incorporates both this ﬁrst incentive as well as a second key incentive, a preference to
restrain aggregate spending due to the associated tax liabilities. Second, I provide a welfare
analysis, which includes estimates of the eﬃcient allocation of public goods and the deadweight
loss associated with this common pool problem. Finally, while the analysis of DelRossi and
I n m a nr e l i e so ne x o g e n o u sp o l i c ys h o c k s ,m ym e thodology, which can be implemented using
widely-available data on voting records and the beneﬁts and costs of legislation, has broader
application.
This paper is also related to a broader literature on the determinants of roll-call voting
behavior in Congress. Peltzman (1985) ﬁnds that, after controlling for persistent regional dif-
ferences in ideology, Senators from states reaping the largest net beneﬁts from federal spending
programs were more likely to support expansions of such programs, as captured by an aggregate
voting index constructed by the National Taxpayers Union. In an examination of the electoral
beneﬁts of securing pork, Sellers (1997) ﬁnds an interesting interaction between Congressional
voting records and pork. In districts receiving substantial pork, incumbents with ﬁscally liberal
voting records perform better electorally than do ﬁscal conservatives. In low-pork districts,
by contrast, ﬁscal conservatives perform better. Stein and Bickers (1995) note that, while
many federal spending programs are concentrated in a minority of Congressional districts, such
programs are often approved by overwhelming majorities in Congress. They argue that, in
order to guarantee passage, special interest groups beneﬁting from such programs tend to make
campaign contributions to a large group of representatives. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) down-
play the role of economic factors, arguing that a single dimension, which can be interpreted as
ideology, explains nearly all of variation in roll-call votes in Congress since the 1970s.
3 Theoretical Framework
This theoretical section serves two purposes. First, it formally documents the common pool
incentives facing legislators to increase own-district spending but to restrain aggregate spending.
Second, the theoretical model provides a framework for measuring legislator responses to such
incentives. Given this empirical focus, the model is kept simple, focusing on local public goods
funded from a national tax base and abstracting from other potentially important factors in
the centralized provision of local public goods, such as spillovers, heterogeneity in preferences,
and economies of scale.
43.1 Setup
Consider a legislature with J (odd) members, or jurisdictions, which are indexed by j and are
of equal population N.2 The economy has J +1goods, a private good (c) and a vector of
local public goods [g =( g1,g 2,...,g J)], one for each jurisdiction. For simplicity, individual
preferences are assumed identical within and across jurisdictions. Individual utility over the
local public good and private goods is assumed quasi-linear:
U(gj,c ij)=h(gj)+cij (1)
Utility from local public goods [h(gj)] is assumed increasing and concave and is normalized such
that zero utility is obtained from zero spending [h(0) = 0]. Finally, each resident in jurisdiction
j is endowed with mj units of the private good, which can be converted into public goods at a
dollar-for-dollar rate.
Given this setup, consider a normative benchmark, which will be used to evaluate the
performance of centralized governments in providing public goods. The Samuelson provision
of public projects (gS
j ) can be characterized as follows:
Nh0(gS
j )=1 , j =1 ,2,...,J (2)
This expression equates the total willingness to pay across constituents to the marginal cost
of provision. While the Samuelson level of public goods would be that chosen by a national
planner, centralized legislatures consist of elected representatives, who face incentives to serve
local, rather than national, interests. The remainder of this section documents the eﬀects of
this divergence between national and local interests on the level and cross-jurisdiction allocation
of public goods.
A key feature of centralized provision is that tax ﬁnancing is assumed to be shared equally
across the federation. That is, total jurisdiction tax liabilities are given by τ = G
J ,w h e r eG is
total federal public spending. This common pool feature of centralized tax systems will play
an important role below.
A legislature, consisting of one representative from each jurisdiction, chooses both the aggre-
gate supply of public goods (G) as well as the distribution of this budget across jurisdictions.
I abstract from agency considerations and simply assume that each representative seeks to
maximize the utility of a representative constituent:
2The equal population assumption is reasonable in this empirical analysis of Congressional districts, which





I next consider two commonly-studied political processes in the theoretical literature: legislative
bargaining and universalism.
3.2 Legislative bargaining
Consider ﬁrst a two-stage version of the legislative bargaining model due to Baron and Ferejohn
(1987 and 1989).3 In the ﬁrst stage, an agenda-setter (j = a), whose identity is determined ex-
ogenously, proposes a distribution of public spending (gL). In the second stage, each legislator
votes on the proposed budget. If the proposal receives a majority of votes, it is implemented;
otherwise, a reversion distribution of zero spending is implemented (gR = 0).
Using the normalization that constituents receive zero utility from public goods under the
reversion budget [h(0) =0], legislators will support the proposal if the total beneﬁts accruing
to the district exceed its share of the tax costs:
h(gL
j ) ≥ τ/N (4)
Incorporating the voting rule of each legislator, given in equation 4, the proposer will max-
imize the utility of his representative constituent, subject to the constraint that at least J−1
2
other representatives support the proposal. Given majority rule and the common pool tax base
(τ = G/J), the proposer has an incentive to form a majority coalition M, not including the
p r o p o s e r ,o fm i n i m u ms i z eJ−1


























,j ∈ M (6)
gL
j =0 ,j/ ∈ M, j 6= a (7)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the proposal support constraint given by equation 4. As
characterized in equation 5, the proposer internalizes both his district’s share of the tax costs
1
J, as well as the shadow cost λ
J for each district in the size J−1
2 coalition. While jurisdictions
excluded from the coalition are under-provided, public goods are over-provided for either the
3This section follows Persson and Tabellini (2002).
6agenda-setter (j = a), members of the winning coalition (j ∈ M), or possibly both.4 Due
to the incentives created by national tax ﬁnancing of local public goods, the proposer uses his
agenda-setting powers in order to misallocate resources for the beneﬁt of his home jurisdiction
and/or those jurisdictions represented in the majority coalition. This misallocation comes at
the expense of those jurisdictions excluded from the coalition.
3.3 Universalism
Consider next the legislative model of universalism due to Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen
(1981). Given the empirical focus on voting decisions, the model is adapted to incorporate
this aspect of the political process. In the ﬁrst stage, the legislature operates under a mode
of universalism; each representative independently chooses spending for their district. Taken
together, these choices on the part of representatives form a proposal (gU). In the second
stage, each representative votes over whether or not to accept this proposal, relative to a zero
reversion distribution.
Given a proposal, representatives follow voting rules identical to those of the legislative
bargaining model. That is, representatives support proposals under which the beneﬁts accruing
to the jurisdiction exceed the tax costs associated with aggregate provision:
h(gU
j ) ≥ τ/N (8)
Taking these voting rules as given, each representative chooses spending levels in order to equate






Thus, as shown in equation 9, public goods are over-provided, relative to the Samuelson condi-
tion, in every jurisdiction. Due to concentrated project beneﬁts and dispersed tax costs, each
representative internalizes only their jurisdiction’s share of the tax costs.
4 Empirical model
This section tests for the common pool incentives documented above using the representative
voting decision rule in equations 4 and 8. As demonstrated, this voting rule is consistent with
both the legislative bargaining and universalism models and thus does not rely upon either of
4Speciﬁcally, there is no shadow cost λ such that both the proposer and winning coalition members are under-
provided, relative to the Samuelson conditions. In order for both to be underprovided [Nh
0(gj) ≥ 1], one can
show that 2 ≤ λ ≤
2
J+1, an obvious contradiction.
7the assumed underlying political process. More generally, this voting rule is consistent with
any political process in which representatives, through majority voting, have the ﬁnal authority
within the legislature over proposed project allocations.
For estimation purposes, consider the following utility speciﬁcation:
h(gj)=γgα
j (10)
where α ∈ (0,1) captures the marginal utility in own-district project spending. The utility
parameter γ captures preferences for public goods and, while assumed homogenous in the
theoretical section, is allowed to vary across jurisdictions empirically:
γj =e x p ( θXj + σξj) (11)
where the vector Xj and scalar ξj represent observed and unobserved preferences for public
spending. Using these two parameterizations in the proposal support condition, given by
equations 4 and 8, and allowing population Nj and federal tax burdens τj to vary across
jurisdictions, representative j will support the proposal if the utility beneﬁts accruing to the
district exceed its share of the total tax cost:
exp(θXj + σξj)gα
j ≥ τj/Nj (12)
Next, assume that, conditional on observed preferences, population, own-district spending and
tax costs, unobserved preferences are distributed standard normal [ξj|Xj,N j,g j,τj ∼ N(0,1)].














where Φ is the standard normal distribution function.5 Typically, the standard deviation of
unobserved preferences (σ) is normalized to one in Probit models; I have chosen instead to
estimate σ and to normalize utility to be measured in dollars, as expressed in equation 1.
This voting rule in equation 13 highlights, in a very simple way, the common pool incentives
facing legislators. Conditional on tax costs (τj), the probability of supporting the proposal is
increasing in own-district spending (gj). Countering this preference for higher spending, the
probability of supporting the proposal is decreasing in the tax costs associated with aggregate
spending (τj), conditional on own-district spending (gj).
5Since this probit equation includes the natural log of own-spending, one dollar is added to public spending
in all districts to account for zero spending in some districts.
8The remainder of this paper uses evidence from Congressional voting over transportation
projects to empirically document the responsiveness of legislator choices to such incentives.
To the extent that legislators do respond, I will then use the estimated underlying utility
parameters (α,σ,θ) to uncover the eﬃcient, or Samuelson, project sizes and the deadweight
loss associated with this common pool problem.
5 Transportation projects
Implementation of this empirical model requires data on legislator voting records, district-
speciﬁc public spending, and the distribution of tax liabilities across jurisdictions. While Con-
gressional votes on authorization or annual appropriation bills seem likely candidates, there
are several problems with this approach. First, these types of legislation often have non-ﬁscal
policies attached to public spending provisions.6 These provisions tend to have diﬀerential
eﬀects across jurisdictions and thus induce both speciﬁcation and measurement error. Second,
in the case of authorization or appropriation bills, the assumption of a zero-spending rever-
sion budget is suspect. When these bills fail to pass, spending is typically supplemented by
continuing resolutions at prior year levels, while Congress continues the bargaining process.
Thus, when deciding whether to support a proposal, legislators trade oﬀ the provisions of the
bill under consideration with both temporary spending under continuing resolutions and future
provisions likely to emerge from ongoing negotiations. Third, federal tax incidence data across
geographic entities, such as states or congressional districts, are not readily available. The Tax
Foundation (2000) has attempted to estimate the cross-state distribution of total federal tax
liabilities. However, in doing so, one encounters thorny issues regarding economic incidence.
For example, are the burdens of the corporate income tax borne by its shareholders, customers,
or employees, each of whom may reside in diﬀerent states?
To overcome these obstacles, I focus on votes over an amendment in the U.S. House of
Representatives designed to strip away 1,653 transportation projects (totaling $9.5 billion)
from the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), which was passed in 1998
and authorized transportation spending for 1998-2003.7 This stripping amendment failed
by a 79-337 vote and the earmarked projects were included in the ﬁnal authorization bill.8
6For example, the 1998 transportation reauthorization contained ethanol tax breaks, drunken driving preven-
tion incentives, air bag policies, and a ban on certain trucks.
7The amendment also stripped away $2 billion in funding for rail transit projects, although the bill did not
earmark these funds for speciﬁc projects. Rather, the bill listed projects that would be eligible to apply to
the Department of Transportation for funding. The Department would then have discretion in allocating these
funds. Due to this lack of information, I simply exclude these transit funds from the analysis.
8Given that the vote was overwhelmingly in favor of supporting the projects, votes by representatives over
9For consistency with the theoretical model, I will refer to the 337 no votes on the stripping
amendment as votes in support of the projects and the 79 yes votes on the stripping amendment
as votes in opposition of the projects. Regarding the ﬁrst problem described above, this
amendment within the authorization bill had narrow language, restricting consideration to
public spending provisions. Second, lending support to the zero spending reversion assumption,
had the amendment passed, the projects would likely have not been included in the ﬁnal
legislation, since the Senate version contained no earmarked projects and President Clinton
had publicly opposed them.9 Of course, were the amendment to pass, these projects could
have been included in future legislation, such as the transportation appropriations bill. Since
such future legislation is unobserved, we view these considerations as beyond the scope of this
study and regard the zero reversion assumption as a reasonable approximation. Regarding the
third complication, measurement of tax burdens at the jurisdiction level, transportation projects
are funded through a single tax, the federal gasoline tax, and the cross-state distribution of
such tax liabilities is readily available.10 While there is little formal evidence on the economic
incidence of gasoline excise taxes, Poterba (1996) and Besley and Rosen (1999) ﬁnd a strong
relationship between after-tax consumer prices and sales taxes, suggesting that residents of a
jurisdiction in which commodity taxes are collected bear a substantial, if not complete, share
of the incidence.
6D a t a
Summary statistics are provided in Table 1. As predicted by the theoretical model, support for
funding of these projects is increasing in own-district spending and decreasing in tax burdens.
Those districts supporting the projects tend to be smaller, more urban and have longer commute
this amendment may have been one of “position-taking”. More speciﬁcally, knowing that the amendment would
fail, representatives used their votes to signal to constituents whether or not their district was a net beneﬁciary
from the funding of these projects. So long as these signals are accurate, however, votes over the amendment will
reﬂect the costs and beneﬁts of these projects. Of course, representatives may use the vote as an opportunity
to signal the beneﬁts and costs of not only the stripping amendment but also of the larger transportation bill.
Unfortunately, most of the funds in the larger bill were transferred to state governments, which then decided how
to allocate the resources across projects within the state. Thus, it is diﬃcult to measure the beneﬁts of the larger
bill across Congressional districts. In the end, this is an empirical question; to the extent that the empirical
results do not provide evidence that votes reﬂect the costs and beneﬁts of these projects, one interpretation is
that representatives were sending signals to voters on the larger transportation bill.
9Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1998.
10Federal gasoline tax revenues are deposited into the Highway Trust Fund. The 1998 reauthorization discon-
tinued the use of this fund for general deﬁcit reduction, eﬀectively creating a trust fund “ﬁrewall”, a dollar-for-
dollar correspondence between gasoline tax revenues and transportation spending.
10times. Regarding industrial composition, those supporting the projects tend to represent
districts with employment in transportation and communications and services, which is the
omitted category in Table 1, although these diﬀerences are quantitatively small. The remainder
of this section describes the construction of the two key variables in the empirical analysis: own-
district spending and tax costs.
6.1 District project spending
In order to match each of the projects with a Congressional district, I relied on the project
description in the bill. These descriptions provide a city or county name, which could be
matched with a district in the Congressional District Atlas (1998). For those cities or counties
with multiple districts, I used a variety of additional sources, including maps from the Atlas,
testimony before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, and press releases from repre-
sentatives’ websites. Approximately 10 percent of project spending could not be assigned to
a speciﬁc district, either due to the project being located in multiple districts or insuﬃcient
information in the project description. Given this lack of information, I simply exclude these
projects from the analysis.11 Finally, since projects are funded over the 1998-2003 horizon,
spending is converted into 1998 dollars using a discount rate of 2.7 percent, the average rate of
inﬂation between 1990 and 1999.
6.2 Tax costs
While the theoretical model assumed that public spending was ﬁnanced exclusively through
central government tax revenues, these transportation projects were funded through a 80 per-
cent federal share and a 20 percent state share; each district’s share of the total tax costs of



















where sj/s is the district’s share of the state costs, ss/f is the state’s share of the federal taxes,
and Sj is the set of other districts within the state.12 Each state’s share of the federal costs
11As an alternative measure, I included multiple-district projects but, somewhat arbitrarily, equally allocated
the spending between the relevant districts. Results using this measure, not reported here, are similar to the
baseline results in this paper.
12This expression implicitly assumes that state governments ﬁnance their 20% share through gasoline tax
revenues. Per Table SF-1 of Highway Statistics (1998), gasoline tax revenues represent 52% of own-source
revenues attributable to highway spending. Further, the two other largest revenue sources, vehicle taxes (26%)
11(ss/f) can be calculated using state-speciﬁc trust-fund receipts, which are available in Highway
Statistics (1998). Unfortunately, each district’s share of state revenues (sj/s)a r en o ta v a i l a b l e .
I make two attempts to resolve this data limitation. The ﬁrst approach, described more
fully in the next paragraph, uses the cross-state variation in tax liabilities (ss/f)t oe s t i m a t e
the within-state variation (sj/s). The second approach simply aggregates the two key district-
level variables, voting decisions and project spending, from the Congressional district-level to
the state-level. After matching these measures with the state-level data on tax liabilities, I
estimate a grouped linear probability model for the sample of 50 states.
In order to estimate the within-state variation in gasoline tax receipts, I use state-level
variation in tax receipts to predict district-level receipts. More speciﬁcally, state trust fund
receipts are regressed on exogenous state characteristics, and the resulting coeﬃcients are then
matched with exogenous district characteristics to predict receipts at the district level. The
results from this regression are provided in Table 2. Given my goal to predict aggregate
receipts at the district level, which are then converted into shares, all regressors are measured
as state aggregates.13 Only two coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant, likely reﬂecting the
small sample of 50 states. However, the R-squared of the regression is 0.9645, suggesting strong









Although the within-state variation in state tax liabilities is generated from these predicted
gasoline tax receipts, it is important to note that two other sources of variation in district
gasoline tax receipts in equation 14, namely cross-state diﬀerences in project spending and
cross-state diﬀerences in tax liabilities, are taken from data sources and are thus independent
of the results of this prediction approach regarding variation in tax liabilities within states.
Given that users of transportation services pay a disproportionate share of gasoline taxes,
unobserved preferences for transportation services may be positively correlated with these mea-
sured tax liabilities. To address this concern of beneﬁts taxation, the econometric analysis
includes controls for observed preferences for transportation services, such as area, percent ur-
ban, commute times, and the composition of employment across industries. However, some
and tolls (8%), should have incidence distributions that are similar to the distribution for gasoline tax revenues
since all three sources tax highway users.
13Thus, the receipts equation represents an underlying individual demand for gasoline, which has been aggre-
gated by summing across all state residents. Results from a per-capita speciﬁcation, not reported here, provide
similar results.
12preferences for transportation, such as geography, are diﬃcult to measure. While this posi-
tive correlation between unobserved preferences and gasoline tax liabilities may lead to biased
parameter estimates, this bias with respect to the tax costs coeﬃcient should, if anything, be
upwards and thus against measuring a negative relationship between tax costs and support for
funding of these projects.
7 Empirical results
7.1 Probit results
The results in Table 3 provide the ﬁrst evidence that legislators respond to common pool
incentives to support own-district spending but to oppose tax costs associated with aggregate
spending. The ﬁrst column of Table 3 presents the results of a Probit voting model that includes
only the two key independent variables from the theoretical model: log own-district spending
and log tax costs.14 As predicted by the theoretical model, the coeﬃcient on own-district
spending is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. While legislators support higher own-district
spending, they attempt to restrain aggregate spending and the associated tax costs, as the
coeﬃcient on tax costs is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. These results demonstrate
that legislators do act on incentives, which are inherent in a system of local public goods
ﬁnanced from a national tax base, to boost own-district spending while restraining the tax
costs associated with aggregate spending. The remainder of this paper provides evidence on
the robustness of this result and then, having found that legislators respond to common pool
incentives, estimates the eﬃcient allocation of public goods and the deadweight loss associated
with this common pool problem.
While the theoretical model does not incorporate heterogeneity in preferences for public
goods, such heterogeneity may cast doubt on the assumption that unobserved preferences ξj
are independent of spending proposals. In particular, both legislative processes that were
examined predict a positive correlation between preferences for public spending (ξj) and own-
district public spending (gj), leading to an upward bias in the project spending coeﬃcient.
Under legislative bargaining, proposers have an incentive to form coalitions that consist of
14Bootstrap standard errors, which are provided in table 3, reﬂect the additional uncertainty arising from
the inclusion of log tax costs, which is a generated regressor. One hundred replications were taken from the
set of Congressional districts, and these observations were used in both the ﬁrst-stage state-level tax receipts
regressions and in the second-stage Probit model. To reﬂect the composition of the bootstrap sample of
Congressional districts, state-level observations in the tax receipts regressions were weighted, with the weights
equal to the number of within-state Congressional districts that were represented in the bootstrap sample divided
by actual number of Congressional districts within the state.
13those districts with a stronger preference for public services.15 Under a norm of universalism,
each representative chooses spending such that the marginal jurisdiction beneﬁte q u a l st h e
marginal jurisdiction cost; thus, districts with a strong preference for public goods will demand
higher spending in their district.
Two approaches are taken to address such endogeneity: inclusion of observable measures
of preferences for transportation services and a state ﬁxed eﬀects model.16 First, the second
column of Table 3 reﬂects the results of a Probit model that includes the following exogenous
district characteristics: area, percent urban, commute times, and industry employment com-
position variables. The inclusion of these district characteristics, which capture observable
heterogeneity in preferences for transportation projects, changes the coeﬃcients on the two key
budgetary variables, own-district spending and tax costs, only slightly. Further, none of these
preference measures are statistically signiﬁcant.
7.2 Fixed eﬀects logit results
To the extent that unobserved preferences for transportation services vary only across states,
the inclusion of state ﬁxed eﬀects will correct for any endogeneity. Although incorporating
ﬁxed eﬀects into probit models is not feasible, Chamberlain (1980) provides a ﬁxed eﬀects
logit estimator and the third column of Table 3 provides such estimates. Since the estimator
uses only variation in votes within states, 126 observations from states without such variation
are dropped. Including these ﬁxed eﬀects, the own-spending coeﬃcient remains positive and
statistically signiﬁcant. While the coeﬃcient on tax costs remains negative, it is statistically
insigniﬁcant, perhaps reﬂecting the loss in power from both dropping observations and rely-
ing exclusively on tax cost variation within states, which is constructed from the state-level
tax receipts regressions in Table 2. Finally, the district characteristics are all statistically
insigniﬁcant in this case.
7.3 Goodness of ﬁt
Representative voting decisions may reﬂect considerations other than the project beneﬁts and
associated tax costs. For example, representatives whose districts fared poorly under the
proposed allocation of funds may have still supported the committee and its proposal in the
15See, for example, Chari, Jones, and Marimon (1997) and Coate (1997).
16Alternatively, one could use a simultaneous equations probit model. However, it is diﬃcult to identify
variables that aﬀect federal spending within the district but not voting decisions of federal representatives. See
Knight (2002) for an analysis using the characteristics of federal representatives as an instrument for federal
spending in an analysis of spending decisions by state oﬃcials.
14hopes of securing funds for their district in future legislation. To address this issue, three
measures of predictive power, or goodness of ﬁt, are provided. The pseudo R-squared, presented
near the bottom of Table 3, ranges between 0.1836 in the ﬁxed eﬀects logit model to 0.2700
for the probit model with exogenous variables. Second, Table 4 provides marginal eﬀects
for the two key independent variables.17 In the Probit model with exogenous variables, a
one-standard deviation increase in the log of own-spending increases the probability of voting
yes by 16 percentage points. For tax costs, a one-standard deviation increase decreases the
probability of voting yes by 7 percentage points. Finally, the Probit model with exogenous
variables correctly predicts the votes for 87 percent of representatives.18 In summary, while
these project spending and tax cost measures certainly do not explain all of the variation in
voting behavior, these three tests suggest that such measures do have eﬀects that are both
economically and statistically signiﬁcant.
7.4 Additional Robustness Checks
While project spending and tax costs are both economically and statistically signiﬁcant deter-
minants of voting behavior, legislator characteristics may also play a role in voting decisions.
Table 5 provides results from a Probit model that includes the following legislator charac-
teristics: an indicator variable for party aﬃliation, tenure (deﬁned as the number of years the
representative has served in the U.S. House), and an indicator for chairing a non-transportation
committee, which may capture whether or not the representative is a House leader.19 As shown,
Republicans were signiﬁcantly less likely to support funding for these projects, suggesting that
ideology played an important role. Neither tenure nor chairing a committee signiﬁcantly af-
fected the results. While party aﬃliation certainly plays an important role in voting decisions,
the coeﬃcient on own-spending remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant in all cases and
the coeﬃcient on tax costs remains negative, although it is statistically insigniﬁcant in two out
of the three speciﬁcations in Table 5.
Having found evidence consistent with the common tax pool problem, a key hypothesized
disadvantage to the centralized provision of local public goods, a natural question is whether
17Marginal eﬀects are not available for the ﬁxed eﬀects logit model since the state ﬁxed eﬀects are not uncovered
in the estimation procedure.
18Using standard procedures, this analysis predicts that a representative will vote yes if the predicted proba-
bility exceeds one-half.
19Representation on the transportation authorization committee could not be included in the Probit model
because all committee members voted in favor of funding the projects. Rather than including this variable,
I estimated the Probit model using only non-committee members in order to evaluate the role of committee
membership. The results, not reported here, were qualitatively similar to those in the baseline results, suggesting
that committee membership alone is not driving the results.
15there are potentially oﬀsetting advantages to centralization. The federalism literature has
focused on the ability of centralized governments to internalize cross-jurisdiction spillovers.20
Consider next an extended speciﬁcation of utility from public goods, which allows constituents








where Γj denotes the set of neighbors and β captures spillover beneﬁts.21 Incorporating



















Neighbors are deﬁned as the set of districts sharing a common border. These borders were
identiﬁed using the map Congressional Districts of the 105th Congress of the United States
(1998). As shown in Table 5, the coeﬃcient on spending in border districts is small and
statistically insigniﬁcant across all three speciﬁcations, suggesting that project spillovers across
congressional districts are not substantial. The coeﬃcients on the two key measures, own-
district spending and tax costs, are similar to those in the baseline results of Table 3.
7.5 State-level Analysis
As noted above, data on gasoline tax liabilities are available only at the state level. To address
this data limitation, this section provides an analysis in which all three key variables, voting
decisions, project spending, and tax liabilities, are measured at the state level. Relative to
the analysis at the Congressional-district level, this state-level analysis has several advantages.
First, the state-level analysis avoids the need to predict tax liabilities at the district level.
Second, even with accurate measures of district tax payments, shopping across Congressional
district borders for gasoline may create a divergence between district payments and district
incidence. While consumers certainly shop for gasoline across state boundaries, this cross-
state shopping is surely less pervasive than cross-border shopping at the Congressional-district
20Previous empirical analyses of spillovers include Case, Rosen and Hines (1993), who examine state govern-
ment spending in a decentralized setting and ﬁnd strong evidence of spillovers, even after allowing for common
random shocks among neighbors.
21One drawback of this Cobb-Douglass speciﬁcation is that utility is zero when spending is zero in any of the





G−j is sum, rather than the product, of spending in all neighboring districts. Results using this speciﬁcation
were similar, with β positive, but small and statistically insigniﬁcant.
16level. These advantages of the state-level analysis, however, should be weighed against two
possibly oﬀsetting disadvantages, relative to the analysis at the district level. First, there is
a loss of information in aggregating data on voting decisions and project spending from the
district-level to the state-level. Second, there is a loss in statistical power from the reduction
in the sample size from 416 Congressional districts to 50 states.











where the left-hand side variable is the proportion of representatives from state s supporting
the projects and the two key right-hand side variables, state project spending and state tax
costs, are at the state level and are measured in per-capita terms.22
A ss h o w ni nT a b l e6 ,t h es i m p l e s ts p e c i ﬁcation, which includes only a constant term in
the vector of observable characteristics (Xs), is consistent with the results from the Congres-
sional district analysis. Support for funding of the projects among Congressional delegations
is increasing in own-state spending but is decreasing in state gasoline tax costs associated with
aggregate spending. As a robustness check, column 2 controls for observable state characteris-
tics (area, percent urban, commute times, and the cross-industry composition of employment).
In this case, own-spending within the state continues to have a positive and statistically sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect on Congressional delegation support for the proposal; tax costs continue to have
a negative eﬀect, although this result is statistically insigniﬁcant, perhaps reﬂecting the loss
in power from the reduction in the sample size from 416 Congressional districts to 50 states.
Columns 3 and 4 control for delegation characteristics (proportion Republican, average tenure,
and the proportion chairing non-transportation committees). As shown, delegation support
for the projects is increasing in state spending in both columns, and this result is statistically
signiﬁcant. The measured relationship between tax costs and delegation support is negative,
although the result in the ﬁnal column, which controls for characteristics of the state as well
as characteristics of Congressional delegations, is statistically insigniﬁcant.
8W e l f a r e a n a l y s i s
Theoretical analyses have focused on political ineﬃciencies in the allocation of local public
goods resulting from common tax pool incentives in central legislatures. Having found evidence







Nj . Taking state averages of both sides of this linear probability model, and noting that Congressional district
populations within states are equal, one can derive the grouped linear probability model in equation 18.
17that representatives respond to such common pool incentives at both the Congressional-district
level and the state-level, this section uses the parameter estimates from the preceding empirical
analysis to test for the existence of and to gauge the magnitude of such ineﬃciencies in the
allocation of public goods.
8.1 Estimates of Underlying Parameter
Using equation 13, Probit coeﬃcients can be converted into estimates of the underlying parame-
ters of the theoretical model. For example, the implied value of σ is given by inverting the tax
cost coeﬃcient and switching the sign. Using the baseline Probit coeﬃcients in Table 3, these
implied parameters are given in Table 7. The implied α ranges from 0.0790 to 0.1318, sug-
gesting signiﬁcant diminishment in marginal utility from these transportation projects. Taken
together, these implied parameter estimates support the model speciﬁcation, as σ is positive,
and α is both positive and lies between zero and unity. Note that these restrictions on the
parameter set were in no way imposed by the Probit estimator.
8.2 Estimates of Samuelson funding levels
Using parameter estimates from the baseline probit model with exogenous variables, I next
calculate the eﬃcient distribution of highway projects. Abstracting from the stochastic com-
ponent (ξj =0 ), the Samuelson condition in equation 2 is given by:
Nj exp(θXj)αgα−1
j =1 (19)





These Samuelson project sizes can also be interpreted as those chosen by individual represen-
tatives forced to fully internalize the tax costs of public spending in their district.
As shown in Table 8, while those districts represented on the transportation authorization
committee received nearly three times the level of spending in other districts, the welfare-
maximizing levels are only a fraction higher. Further, while 47 percent of those districts
without committee representation were under-provided, only 10 percent of those with committee
representation were under-provided. If committee representation confers political power, this
welfare analysis conﬁrms the theoretical prediction of the legislative bargaining model, which
demonstrated a misallocation from politically weak to politically powerful districts. While
several jurisdictions are under-provided, the majority are over-provided and therefore aggregate
actual spending of $7.5 billion signiﬁcantly exceeds the $5.0 billion aggregate eﬃcient spending.
188.3 Deadweight Loss Estimates
For these over-provided districts, the marginal national costs of provision exceed the marginal
national beneﬁts, while the opposite holds for under-provided districts. Figure 1 depicts the
deadweight losses associated with this misallocation. This deadweight loss can be expressed
analytically as follows:
DWL = Nj exp(θXj)[(gS






The estimated deadweight loss, provided in Table 8, totals $7.2 billion, or 96 cents for every
dollar spent on these transportation projects. Even under the maintained assumption of
legislators perfectly representing constituent preferences, there is signiﬁcant deadweight loss
from a national perspective due to the incentives created by concentrated project beneﬁts and
dispersed tax costs. This estimate is much higher than Inman (1988), who measured deadweight
loss at 17 cents for every dollar spent. Inman’s lack of cross-sectional data may have caused
downward bias in deadweight loss estimates since under-spending districts and over-spending
districts tend to cancel out one another when aggregating spending across all districts. On
the other hand, the deadweight loss estimate here is potentially overstated here if state or local
governments supplemented federal spending for those under-provided districts.
9C o n c l u s i o n
In summary, this paper uses Congressional votes over transportation project funding in order
to test for common pool incentives. This empirical voting analysis is shown to be consistent
with the two most commonly-used legislative processes in the theoretical literature and is thus
quite general. The empirical results are consistent with legislator reactions to common pool
incentives: the probability of supporting funding for these projects is increasing in own-district
spending but is decreasing in the tax costs associated with aggregate spending. Having found
that legislators do respond to common pool incentives, I then use the parameter estimates to
calculate the eﬃcient level of public goods, which suggest over-spending in aggregate, especially
in politically powerful districts, and large associated deadweight loss.
While I ﬁnd signiﬁcant deadweight loss from federal provision of these transportation ser-
vices, it is important to note that this critique of centralized provision is speciﬁc to the projects
under consideration. National networks, such as the interstate highway system or Amtrak,
m a yh a v em o r ep r e v a l e n ts p i l l o v e re ﬀects than the projects considered here and may therefore
be provided more eﬃciently in a centralized setting. Similarly, other public policies, such as
19regulations, may exhibit signiﬁcant uniformity under centralized assignment, a disadvantage of
centralization that has been the focus of the economic federalism literature.23
Given this caveat, I have found signiﬁcant costs to centralized provision of these trans-
portation projects. It is often assumed that central governments act as a benevolent social
planner, maximizing national welfare. This analysis casts doubt on that assumption, demon-
strating that the federal government consists of agents facing incentives to serve local, rather
than national, interests. This clash between national and local interests, combined with asym-
metries in political power, leads to a misallocation of economic resources from politically weak
to politically powerful districts.
23See Oates (1972 and 1999). Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (2001) study liquor regulations, which tend to be
set uniformly under centralization. Their primary ﬁnding is that states with more heterogeneous preferences
tend to decentralize decision-making to local governments.
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23Table 1
Summary statistics, 416 Congressional districts
(sample averages, standard deviation in parentheses)
variable support projects not support description source
N=337 N=79
project spending
own spending $21,040,860 $5,743,392 projects author
(gj) (17,170,160) (8,306,591) in district tabulations
coalition member 0.9169 0.4304 positive spending author
1[gj > 0] (0.2764) (0.4983) in district tabulations
tax cost $17,887,410 $18,839,510 cost of author prediction
(τj) ($6,198,413) ($5,170,653) proposal (see Table 2)
demand measures
area 0.0215 0.0299 millions of Congressional
(0.0968) (0.0604) sq. kilometers Districts (Census)
percent urban 0.7475 0.7291 percent in Congressional
(0.2217) (0.2154) urban area Districts (Census)
commute time 10.0588 9.7773 avg. commute Congressional
(2.4523) (2.3568) (in minutes) Districts (Census)
industry
% agriculture 0.0337 0.0423 %e m p l o y e d Congressional
& mining (0.0319) (0.0358) in industry Districts (Census)
%c o n s t r u c t i o n 0.2409 0.2409 %e m p l o y e d Congressional
& manufacturing (0.0643) (0.0778) in industry Districts (Census)
% transportation 0.0713 0.0683 %e m p l o y e d Congressional
& communication (0.0156) (0.0145) in industry Districts (Census)
%t r a d e 0.2118 0.2171 %e m p l o y e d Congressional
(0.0197 (0.0190) in industry Districts (Census)
24Table 2
Trust Fund Receipts Equation Results, 50 States
Receipts Source: Highway Statistics, 1998 (Table FE-9)
(** 95% signiﬁcance, * 90% signiﬁcance)










agriculture & mining 2.3447**
(0.6365)
construction & manufacturing 0.1143
(0.2208)







25Table 3: Representative voting decisions - baseline speciﬁcation
(** 95% signiﬁcance, * 90% signiﬁcance, constant not reported, bootstrap standard errors)
Probit Probit FE Logit
dep. variable vote vote vote
observations 416 416 290
own-spend. 0.1084** 0.1095** 0.1544**
(in logs) (0.0131) (0.0120) (0.0398)
tax costs -0.8463** -0.8312* -1.9544





commute time -0.0265 -0.1696
(0.0734) (0.2495)
% agriculture -1.1717 4.7140
&m i n i n g (4.5276) (21.7876)
%c o n s t r . 0.9759 5.1119
&m f g (1.9343) (6.7321)
%t r a n s . 14.5034 41.1300
& comm. (9.4279) (26.1207)
%t r a d e -2.7533 5.6248
(6.3740) (19.3125)
R-squared 0.2555 0.2700 0.1836
Table 4: Probit marginal eﬀects - key parameters
(** 95% signiﬁcance, * 90% signiﬁcance)
Probit Probit std. deviation
district characteristics no yes
log own-spending 0.0248** 0.0245** 6.3754




(** 95% signiﬁcance, * 90% signiﬁcance, bootstrap standard errors)
Probit Probit FE Logit Probit Probit FE Logit
dependent variable vote vote vote vote vote vote
district characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
own-spending 0.1075** 0.1101** 0.1734** 0.1064** 0.1079** 0.1547**
(in logs) (0.0124) (0.0132) (0.0517) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0352)
tax costs -0.5001* -0.1760 -0.0176 -0.9500** -0.9066 -1.9886
(in logs) (0.2911) (0.4085) (3.2489) (0.4178) (0.4413) (3.8714)
republican -0.9059** -0.9729** -2.0951**
(0.2264) (0.2658) (0.7683)
tenure 0.0122 0.0108 0.0356
(0.0145) (0.0158) (0.0461)
committee chair -0.2191 -0.2392 -1.2755
(0.4036) (0.5009) (8.4901)
neighbor spending 0.0027 0.0032 -0.0036
(in logs) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0099)
R-squared 0.2602 0.2742 0.1872 0.2580
27Table 6
Key parameters
Grouped (state-level) linear probability models
(** 95% signiﬁcance, * 90% signiﬁcance, robust standard errors)
(dependent variable is proportion within delegation supporting project funding, 50 observations)
state characteristics no yes no yes
delegation characteristics no no yes yes
own-spending 0.0108** 0.0106** 0.0137** 0.0130**
(per-capita) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0022)
tax costs -0.0170** -0.0043 -0.0204** -0.0088
(per-capita) (0.0046) (0.0069) (0.0059) (0.0070)
R-squared 0.4093 0.5362 0.4908 0.5979
Table 7: Implied parameters
Probit Probit FE Logit Assumed Range
Controls no yes yes
implied α 0.1281 0.1318 0.0790 [0,1]




Committee representation No representation
N=72 N=344
Actual spending $38,460,510 $13,881,810
Samuelson spending $12,472,150 $11,880,230
percent over-spend 90.3 percent 52.9 percent














Figure 1: Welfare Analysis
29